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PRICES HAVE INCREASED ever more rapidly
since 1965, and in the past year overall prices have
risen more than 5 per cent. The inflation has re-
distributed income and wealth and contributed to
inefficiency. The Government began taking actions in
mid-1968 designed to restrain inflation, Since elimi-
nating inflation, by necessity, involves costs, a course
of gradual correction has been followed with the
objective of holding such costs to a tolerable level.
In this article, recent developments are reviewed
with the objective of throwing some light on: 1)
progress made in reducing inflation; 2) costs of adjnst-
ing to the inflation; and 3) costs generated by the
struggle to reduce the inflation,
As in two previous articles in this Rcciew, the
current situation is compared with three earlier
periods of economic correction.1 August 1969 is used
here as a tentative beginning for the current adjust-
ment, since it is the middle of the quarter when
output of goods and services was greatest. Develop-
ments since August are compared with developments
in the corresponding periods after the July 1953, July’
1957, and May 1960 peaks, as selected by the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research. These three
earlier periods were quite mild corrections judged in
the light of longer experience in modern economic
history.
Progress Against Inflation
Inflation has proceeded at a faster and faster rate
since 1964. Overall prices, which had been rising less
1
”Downturn Remains Mild,” this Review (June 1970), pp. 2-7,
and “Extent of the Slowdown,” this Review (March 1970),
pp. 2-5 and 14-16.
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than 1½ per cent a year in the early 1960’s, increased
2 per cent in 1965, 3.5 per cent in 1966 and 1967,
4 per cent in 1968, and 5 per cent in 1969. The
acceleration of price advance reflected a rise in total
spending for goods and services at an average 8 per
cent annual rate from late 1964 to late 1969, or
roughly’ double the rise in production capacity. The
excessive rise in total spending was fostered by gen-
erally expansive fiscal and monetary actions from 1964
through 1968.2
From the thud quarter last year to the second
quarter this year, overall prices rose at an estimated
5.3 per cent annual rate, even faster than the 5 per
cent increase in the previous year. To many, this is
evidence that the struggle against inflation has failed,
However, prices respond to many factors, including
lagged effects of previous excesses, and since the
current period of correction follows about four years
of growing inflationary pressures, some temporary con-
tinued acceleration of price rises was to be expected.
As inflation intensifies, it becomes more resistant to
corrective measures, and prices continue to rise for a
period after excessive “demand-pull” pressures on
resources and prices are removed. In the year before
the three previous business cycle peaks, prices rose
an average of 2 per cent. In the first two quarters of
the correction periods, prices rose at an average 2.3
per cent annual rate. Thereafter, the rate of price
rise began moderating. The strong upward thrust of
prices during the initial phase of restrained spending
growth may reflect the fact that spending, although
dampened, may nevertheless he excessive for a few
2
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months. Further, many prices and wages do not adjust
immediately in the presence of unduly large demand
pressures. This may be due to inertia, lack of knowl-
edge of real costs, public opinion, regulations, con-
tracts, or a money illusion. These lagging price
adjustments place “cost-push” forces on other prices
svhen they do occur. Consequently, success in the
struggle against inflation, once it has been permitted
to gain momentum, takes time,
A quick dampening of inflation is even less likely
now than in the 1953-54, 1957-58 or 1960-61 periods
for several reasons: the upward thrust of prices has
been much stronger than during the earlier periods;
policies to resist inflation have been milder; and their
impact on spending has been less. Total spending on
goods and services has slowed only moderately since
the third quarter of last year to an estimated 4 per cent
annual rate of increase. In sharp contrast, spending
declined at a 2 per cent average rate inthe correspond-
ing periods of the three previous adjustments.
Other developments also reflect the gradualism of
the recent approach to resisting inflation. Retail
sales rose at an estimated 4 per cent annual rate from
August to May, a slightly greater rate than in the
previous year. In the corresponding nine months after
the three previous peaks, retail sales declined at a2
per cent average rate. Personal income, likewise, has
slowed little since last August in marked contrast to
earlier experiences.
With growth of total spending held to rates approx-
imating growth in the nation’s productive capacity,
progress is probably being made at reducing inflation-
ary pressures. Comparisons with previous experiences,
when inflation was less ingrained and when anti-
inflationary measures were pursued more aggi-essively,
indicate that a substantial reduction of the current
inflation will take a long time. According to estimates
of this bank, if the gradual approach to resisting in-
flation is continued, substantial price stability may not
be achieved for three more years.3
Costs of Adjusting to Inflation
The costs of inflation have been substantial and
far-reaching. Some have suggested that once inflation
becomes fully anticipated and provided for in all
contracts and other transactions, its cost would be
very light, perhaps even zero. However, the current
inflation has not been fully anticipated, and ‘while
some adjustments to it have been made, many others
have not. As a result, the inflation has had, and is
likely to continue to have, severe consequences. In
brief, inflation reduces the value of money and other
dollar-denominated assets relative to the value of
other assets, causing a redistribution of wealth and
income. The process of adaptin.gto higher and higher
rates of inflation, given existing contracts, laws, and
other rigidities, causes inefficiencies, inequities, and
interruptions to production.
Some costs that society has suffered in the process
of adjusting to higher and higher rates of inflation
have been incorrectly labeled a cost of resisting infla-
tion. One example is the capital loss experienced by
some bondholders in recent years. Some have said
interest rates have been increased (bond prices low-
ered) in an attempt to reduce the excessive spending
by making credit more cosily and difficult to obtain. It
has been suggested that this raising of interest rates
has proceeded so rapidly that it has fostered fears of
a liquidity squeeze or money panic.
However, most of the rise in interest rates (decline
in bond prices) since the mid-1960’s has probably
been a result of a market adjustment to higher and
higher price expectations. With inflationary anticipa-
tions, lenders seek to protect the purchasing power
of funds by raising rates, while borrowers pay higher
rates, expecting to repay in depreciated dollars. If
both borrower and lender expect 5 per cent inflation
during the period of the loan, and funds are worth a
real 4 per cent, the interest rate stated in the contract
will be 9 per cent, and existing 4 per cent bonds will
3
Fom a discussion of the pmocedure used to demive these
estimates, see “A Monetarist Model for Economic Stabiliza-
tion,” this Review (April 1970), pp. 7-25, and the “Quarterly
Economic Tmends” release of this Bank.
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Prices of highest-grade seasoned corporate bonds
declined (yields rose) 14 per cent from last August
to June. In the corresponding ten-month periods of
the three earlier adjustments, these bond prices rose
5per cent on average. Monetary restraint was actually
greater in the three earlier periods, as measured by a
slower injection of bank reserves and money. A major
difference between the recent situation and the earlier
periods is that price expectations have apparently
continued to be revised upward, while at similar
stages of earlier cycles, when smaller inflations were
more aggressively resisted, price expectations had
already begun to be revised downward.
Stock prices have nearly paralleled the pattern of
bond prices, and possibly for the same reason. As
investors revise their inflationary expectations upward,
the return anticipated from dividends and stock
appreciation increases. When inflationary expectations
go up from, say, 2 per cent a year to 5 per cent, and
yields on bonds go up from, say, 6 per cent a year to
9 per cent, long-run expected stock returns (dividends
plus appreciation) may go up from, say, 9 per cent
a year to 12 per cent. Because of contracts, regula-
tions, inertia, and other rigidities which restrain cor-
4
”Interest Rates and Price Level Changes, 1952-69,” this Review
(December 1969), pp. 18-38. This example ignores the income
tax consideration for both lender and borrower; actually with
the assumptions of 4 per cent meal return and 5 per cent
anticipated inflation, the market mate would be higher than
9 per cent.
From last August to June, stock prices (Standard
and Poor’s 500 Composite) fell 20 per cent, After ten
months of the three previous recessions, stock prices
had already risen an average 9 per cent above their
levels at the business cycle peaks. The sharply differ-
ent experience apparently cannot be fully explained
by a weaker business situation this time. Corporate
profits after taxes declined at a 14 per cent annual
rate from the third quarter last year to the first
quarter this year. In the corresponding two quarters
in the previous corrections, corporate profits fell at a
28 per cent average rate.
Stocks and bonds are not the only assets that are
affected in value by rising inflation and inflationary
expectations, but more attention is given to these
markets because of widespread availability of frequent
quotations. The value of mortgages and other debts
have declined similarly. The purchasing power of
most pensions has been reduced. Also, lessors (unless
protected by escalators) have suffered a decline in
real estate values. On the other hand, inflation has
given windfall gains to debtors and holders of some
other types of assets, contributing to inequities among
individuals.
fall in market price sufficiently to yield 9 per cent a
year to maturity.4
porations from maximizing returns on capital in the
short run, part of this adjustment for existing stocks
may be accomplished in the market by a lowering of
prices. In the long run, however, stock prices will
reflect the inflated cost of resources going into capital
formation.
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Once inflationary expectations become strong, it
is difficult and costly to extinguish them. Commit-
ments made on the expectation of continued inflation
become more difficult to fulfill if the inflation is less
than anticipated. When excessive spending is damp-
ened, many prices do not move quickly to their
equilibrium levels, and declines in production and
employment result. As noted above, growth of total
spending has slowed since last August to about the
trend rate of growth in capacity. Since overall prices
have continued to rise rapidly, there have been cut-
backs in output and production.
The recent slowdown in production is a cost neces-
sary to limit price increases, If spending growth con-
tinues to be appropriately limited, prices gradually
will rise more slowly, and production will improve as
prices rise less rapidly.
It may be, however, that much of the adjustment in
production to date has merely been a transitional
cost to a fuller anticipation of the inflation, In the
initial stages of accelerating inflation, economic activ-
ity receives a stimulus. Individuals and businesses
with greater money balances than they desire to hold
increase their spending even at higher prices, the
greater spending causes businessmen to revise upward
their profit expectations, and investment is expanded.
However, since total spending is excessive, prices are
bid up. Costs are higher and profits lower than ex-
pected in real terms. As a result, when the rate of
inflation becomes more fully anticipated, its stimula-
tive effects diminish, and growth rates of spending,
production and employment slow to their trend rates,
or even below for a brief adjustment period. In the
following discussion an attempt is made to gain some
insight into the magnitude of production cutbacks,
without attempting to judge whether they are a result
of an adjustment to a higher rate of inflation or are a
result of a burden assumed to place downward
pressure on prices.
Total real output, like total spending, has reacted
much less since last summer than during the three
previous periQds of correction. From the third quarter
last year to thri second quarter this year, real produc-
tion declined at an estimated 1.3 per cent annual
rate. In the first three quarters of previous periods
of adjustment, real output declined at an average 3.4
per cent rate.
Industrial production, like total real product, has
changed much less than in the three recessions. The
decline in industrial production at a 4 per cent rate
from last August to May was much less than during
the first nine months of any of the previous periods
of adjustment, when production fell at an average 14
per cent rate.
Employment trends have been stronger in late 1969
and early 1970 than following the upper turning
points of the three earlier cycles. Since last August,
payroll employment has increased slightly, while in
the corresponding ten months of each of the three
previous correction periods it had declined at an
average annual rate of 3.5 per cent.
A high level of utilization of the potential labor
force is conducive to continued strong upward pres-
sure on wages. In June total civilian employment was
equal to 64 per cent of the population of working
Costs in Reducing Inflation
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Construction is one area where cutbacks have been
as great or greater than in the three previous reces-
sions. It may be that construction is being adversely
affected much more from the increasing inflation than
from the efforts to reduce inflation. Construction has
been hurt more than most industries by rising labor,
material, and land prices. Since large amounts of
long-term borrowed funds are used in purchasing
homes and other buildings, construction has also been
affected seriously by the higher interest rates, result-
ing from the rising price anticipations. Construction
has suffered further from heavy financial disintermedi-
ation (resulting from Regulation Q ceilings and similar
rules), and from state usury laws \vhich have favored
large businesses and others who can obtain funds in
the free capital markets.
Recent Stabilization Actions
In implementing the gradual anti-inflationary pro-
gram of the Government, fiscal actions have been
moderately but steadily restrictive in 1969 and 1970.
Since the first quarter of 1969, the high-employment
budget surplus, as estimated by this bank, has been
in the $7 to $11 billion range. This measure, unlike
other measures of Federal Government fiscal devel-
opments, excludes most of the effect on the budget
of changing levels of real economic activity, so as to
observe more clearly the effect of Government actions
on the economy. The surplus in this budget is ex-
pected to decline only slightly during the summer
and fall.
The fiscal restraint since the end of 1968 has been
achieved, in large measure, by a cutback in defense
spending. National defense outlays have declined at
a 0.4 per cent annual rate since the fourth quarter of
1968, after rising 13 per cent annually in the four
previous years. In the first half of 1970, defense
spending amounted to less than 8 per cent of total
gross national product, compared with an average of
9.4 per cent from 1957 through 1963. Nondefense
force age (16 through 64). In the sixteen years from
1950 through 1965 this ratio never exceeded 63.5 and
declined to as low as 60. A somewhat lower utilization
of the labor force is likely in the near future even if
total production rises somewhat, since productivity
gains and growth of population of labor force age
will provide for some increase in output.
expenditures have risen at an 8 per cent rate since the
fourth quarter of 1968, following a 12 per cent rate
in the previous four years. On the other hand, the
Government, by removing the surtax in two steps,
January 1 and July 1, 1970, took partially offsetting
expansive actions,
The current fiscal restraint, as measured by the
high-employment surplus, is much milder than during
the 1959-61 period of correction and, relative to the
size of the economy, is even less than during the
1956-58 period. The 1953-54 adjustment, which was
the longest period of correction reviewed here, oc-
curred paradoxically at a time when the budget was
expansive.
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Indications are that Federal budget requirements
will place large demands on money and capital mar-
kets in coming months. The Government’s official
budget, in contrast with the high-employment budget,
is sliding into deficit because of a marked slowing in
tax collections. \Vhen this factor is added to the
planned activities of Government agency and loan
guarantee operations, the Federal Government’s dc-
mand for funds (both direct and indirect) in fiscal
1971 appears likely to he the largest since fiscal 1968.
Monetary authorities also have followed a compara-
tively moderate course in resisting inflation. Monetary
action, as measured by growth of the money stock,
was restrictive from early 1969 to February 1970. In
the first half of 1969 money rose at a 4 per cent annual
rate, down from a 7 per cent rate in the two previous
years. From June 1969 to February 1970 the money
stock was virtually unchanged.
This recent monetary restraint was more moderate
than during the other periods of correction, probably
contributing to the mildness of the current adjustment.
On average the money stock in the earlier periods
remained on a plateau from ten months before the
peak until six months after the peak.
Since February, money has risen at a very rapid
7 per cent annual rate, This is much faster than during
the relaxation periods following past periods of eco-
nomic correction, and it began sooner; that is, the
sixth month after the peak, compared with an average
of nine months after the previous peaks. The growth
in money since February approximates the expansive
growth in early 1967,
Conclusions
Inflation has been accelerating since the end of
1964. Actions taken to resist the inflation have been
more carefully applied than during previous periods
of economic correction. As a result, total spending has
continued to rise at a near long-run optimum growth
rate. Prices have continued to rise rapidly, and pro-
duction has declined slightly
Continued price increases are disheartening, espe-
cially when there is growing slack in productive
capacity. However, in view of the strong upward
momentum built into the price structure by the
expansive fiscal and monetary actions from 1964
through 1968, and in view of the moderate character
of the policy steps taken to resist the inflation, it is
unlikely that a substantial improvement will materi-
alize for a considerable period. A more aggressive
attack on inflation might have produced quicker re-
sults, hut at the expense of harsher transitional costs
in terms of real product, employment and profits.
The current inflation and the struggle against it
have been accompanied by costs. Production has
declined, construction has been depressed, growth in
employment has slowed, and stock and bond prices
have fallen, Questions have been raised as to whether
the cost of even the gradual approach in reducing
inflation is too great. Yet, many of these supposed
costs of fighting inflation are, in fact, the result of
the economy adjusting to higher expected levels of
inflation, If spending continues to rise moderately,
as it has for a year, some of these costs of adjusting
to greater expected inflation should soon subside. On
the other hand, costs involved in actually reducing
the strong inflationary anticipations, which have prob-
ably been moderate, may intensify and continue for
some time.
There is some evidence that the battle against
inflation may be postponed again as in 1967. Spokes-
man for those hurt seek renewed economic stimula-
tion, \vithout distinguishing whether the pain has
come from adjustments to higher rates of expected
inflation or from adjustments to lower rates. Pressures
are building to expand Government outlays, monetary
expansion has been rapid since February, and an-
realistic hopes are being placed on attempts to talk
prices down. Each time a final showdown with infla-
tion is postponed, the total costs of adjusting, first to
a still higher rate of expected inflation and ultimately
to a lower rate, become greater
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